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 As the great global crisis eases its grasp, it is a time to reconsider relations 
between Brazil and the North, especially the United States and the European Union.  
While the world economy is still reeling, it is very possible that a new and more 
productive period in Brazil’s relations with the US and Europe is possible.  This positive 
outcome derives from numerous factors, most especially Brazil’s “peaceful rise” to a 
more prominent global role and the arrival of the Obama administration whose promise 
of a new beginning in U.S. foreign policy has been greeted with such evident enthusiasm 
in Latin America. 
 
 Three preliminary observations about Brazil suggest that a more productive 
engagement with the transatlantic community of wealthier nations is feasible and 
desirable, and yet also challenging as it goes against the established grain of Brazilian 
foreign policy. 
 
The first observation concerns Brazil’s unique role, carved out over several 
decades, as a bridge to the global South, an influential voice for more inclusive global 
economic management.  Second, the global financial crisis and its aftermath lay bare 
some of the weaknesses in Brazil’s economic strategy, including deficient levels of 
savings, investment, technology, and human capital.   Brazil is keenly aware of the need 
for a more productive interaction with the North to address these weaknesses.    Third, a 
fundamental ambivalence permeates Brazil’s approach to global reform and governance.  
It clearly benefits from the global status quo, i.e., integration with the world market and 
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established institutions.  At the same time, Brazil is structurally anti-status quo, seeking 
opportunities to distance itself from Western ideals and institutions. 1
 
In all, incorporating Brazil on its terms into established institutions of global 
governance will be challenging, but also worth the effort.   The U.S. and the global North 
are well advised in the short-run to encourage the participation of Brazil in the various ad 
hoc global gatherings (e.g., the G-20 group) dealing with the financial crisis.  For the 
long-run, the goal should be to integrate Brazil as a partner into reformed multilateral 
institutions (in finance, trade, and regulation) as a means of assuring more stable global 
growth on the basis of more inclusive global management. 
 
To understand the reasoning behind this recommendation, it is well to consider 
three separate issues: 1) the areas of common interests in foreign economic policy 
between Brazil and the transatlantic community; 2) the roots of Brazil’s traditional 
divergences with the North; and 3) the domestic dynamics in Brazil that are leading to a 
change in its world view.  These issues are considered in turn in this paper, followed by 




Areas of Close Cooperation 
 
 One of the main reasons why a closer relationship with Brazil is desirable is that 
Brazil, Europe, and the U.S. already share fundamental foreign policy goals.  Dealing 
with the global crisis has reinforced a need for cooperation and policy coordination.   
This has been particularly clear in the area of stimulating global demand.  For the first 
time in memory, Brazil has been able to engage in counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary 
policies at home which have managed to stabilize some components of domestic demand.  
The Central Bank of Brazil, for example, has delivered substantial monetary stimulus 
through an accelerated program of interest rate reductions which have brought overnight 
rates in Brazil to single digit levels for the first time in anyone’s memory.  Meanwhile, 
the government has announced a number of emergency fiscal measures which amount to 
about 3% of GDP.    
 
 Brazil has also been an important part of global conversations to bolster the IMF 
as a source of emergency financial liquidity to the most vulnerable emerging economies.  
Just recently, Brazil agreed to subscribe to $10 billion in IMF bonds to bolster the Fund’s 
Special Liquidity Facility.  Brazil is also participating actively in talks to streamline and 
update regulation of global financial institutions.  As a major emerging markets recipient 
of capital flows from global banks, Brazil is going to be an important part of these 
discussions. 
 
                                                 
1For a fuller analysis, see:  Stefan A. Schirm: “Brazil’s Rise as an Emerging Power: Implications for the 
U.S. and Europe”, paper presented for the conference “Brazil’s Rise: A U.S.-European Assessment”, 
Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., June 1-2, 2009. 
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 Apart from emergency measures to deal with the crisis, Brazil’s trade and 
investment interests are highly congruent with those of the U.S. and Europe.  The U.S. is 
still the single largest export market for Brazil.  It is true that Brazil’s trade with the 
global South, especially China and Argentina, has been growing more rapidly, but the 
U.S. and Europe still account for some 50% of Brazil’s total trade.  Brazil and the U.S. 
have basically closed ranks in terms of the need for liberalization of global agricultural 
trade and prompt completion of the stalled Doha Round.  It is significant that Brazil in 
2008 broke ranks with more protectionist emerging markets, such as Argentina, China, 
and India, in order to support a compromise proposed by Pascal Lamy that would have 
restarted the Doha talks.   
 
 Europe, the U.S., and Brazil are closely tied by foreign direct investment flows as 
well as trade.  Every major U.S. and European multinational has operations of some 
importance in Brazil; U.S. firms have been particularly active in the expansion of Brazil’s 
agribusiness.  The huge investment push by Spanish companies in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s has led to truly dominant positions in key sectors, including banking and 
telecommunications, both complementing and balancing the large US presence. 
 
Foreign firms will be expected to compete very aggressively for a share of 
Brazil’s newly discovered crude oil reserves.  In something of a twist, Brazil has also 
spawned a large number of so-called “multilatinas”, domestically based corporate giants 
such as Vale and Gerdau who have expanded aggressively into the U.S. and Europe as 
well as elsewhere.2  Brazil’s stable laws on foreign direct investment stand in sharp 
contrast to the wave of populist nationalizations of foreign and domestic companies that 
is occurring in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina.   
 
 Finally, the development of alternative energy sources and new approaches to 
climate change mitigation are drawing Brazil closer to the transatlantic community.  
Brazil is justly renowned for its pioneering research and production of biofuels; a 2007 
agreement with the U.S. pledged joint efforts to develop a global market for ethanol and 
other biofuels.   In terms of climate change, the post-Kyoto conversations can hardly 
proceed without cooperation with Brazil in terms of reducing emissions and monitoring 
and protecting the Amazon rainforest.   
 
  
Divergences with the North:  Brazil’s South-South Orientation  
 
 
Yet Brazil and the global North are not always in agreement about how the world 
should work or be governed.   The predominant ideology in Brazil’s approach to the 
global economy could be defined as a national development mindset, rooted in a world 
view that was molded by concepts such as center-periphery, industrialized and 
commodity producers, in other words, by a North-South cleavage tying the technological 
haves and have-nots through a system of unequal exchange.   The traditional mindset of a 
                                                 
2 For more on the expansion of Brazil’s multinationals, see: Ben Ross Schneider: “Big Business in Brazil: 
Leveraging Natural Endowments and State Support for International Expansion”, forthcoming. 
Comments to the Conference on Brazil and Transatlantic Relations 
Page 3 of 8 
North-South divide has led Brazil over many decades to be extremely protectionist in 
terms of its industrial sector, in particular.  Buffered from competition by a complex set 
of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and export promotion schemes, the favored sectors in 
industry have always included automobiles, electric and electronic devices, textiles, 
clothing, and footwear.  While published tariffs were reduced unilaterally in the 1990s, 
effective protectionist remains high and the need to continue protecting industry from 
unfair competition in the North is close to an article of faith among both São Paulo elites 
and general public opinion in Brazil.3
 
The deeply held belief in Brazil that increased global engagement with the North 
would inevitably reduce the “space” for autonomous development, meaning mainly 
industrial sector development, has caused Brazil to be skeptical of free trade agreements 
with the North.  This traditional tendency has been accentuated in the Lula government 
and is most evident in the downgrading of bilateral U.S.-Brazil talks and Mercosul-EU 
discussions.   Brazil’s opposition to the U.S.-inspired FTAA resulted in its eventual 
demise.  At the global level, Brazil has been resistant to negotiate new disciplines in the 
WTO in such sensitive areas as investment, trade in services, and government 
procurement. As Schirm reminds us, the G-20 initiative in the Doha Round talks was 
conceived by Brazil and other nations in opposition to EU-US initiatives.4  
 
Brazil has compensated for its lack of wholehearted engagement at the global level by 
pursuing a series of politically symbolic, but economically questionable arrangements 
with the global South.   It has embraced participation in the BRIC group of nations which 
held its first summit in June 2008.  Brazil has conceived and managed Mercosul despite 
its many internal contradictions, and is even pushing to expand membership to include 
Venezuela which is clearly not ready for membership.  The UNASUR framework for 
regional integration in South America has been heavily promoted by Brazil and the 
regional grouping conveniently excludes Mexico and, of course, the United States.  
Farther afield, Brazil has signed limited trade agreements with such minor players as 
Cuba and Morocco and also India.  Its IBSA initiative (India-Brazil-South Africa) has 
attracted significant international attention, though little in the way of economic benefits.   
 
In the realm of ideology, President Lula’s  has been a leading voice demanding a 
more equal distribution of international wealth and power, reform of the IMF and the UN 
and other global bodies, and a stronger role for governments in regulating global market 
forces which Brazil distrusts.  His remarks in China just prior to the BRIC summit calling 




                                                 
3 Pedro da Motta Veiga: “Brazil’s Trade Policy: Moving Away from Old Paradigms”, in Lael Brainard and 
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz (eds.), Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil’s Changing 
Role in the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
4 Schirm, op. cit.  Note that this is in reference to the G-20 group of emerging economies in the context of 
the WTO negotiations, not to be confused with the expanded group of nations which have banded together 
under the aegis of the G-20 to deal with the global financial crisis. 
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Brazil’s Changing World View 
 
 So while Brazil has pressures leading toward greater integration with the 
transatlantic community and countervailing pressures to set itself apart from the North, 
forces within Brazil itself are leading to profound alterations in Brazil’s view of the 
world.   One of these factors has already been alluded to – Brazil has recognized the need 
for shared management of global risks in the present crisis and has been able to make 
positive contributions to domestic and international stability despite the serious nature of 
the shock Brazil has endured.   
 
 As Brazilians have long been accustomed (e.g., in the aftermath of the Asian and 
Russian crises of the late 1990s) to be dragged into the vortex of global crises, the fact 
that the damage to economic growth so far has been minor has been greeted with great 
relief in Brazil.  It is widely recognized that one of the reasons for Brazil’s relatively safe 
passage through the global storm is the economic stability produced by fifteen years in 
Brazil of a rules-based approach to economic management featuring economic practices 
commonly associated with the OECD.  These have included a concern for fiscal 
management, including a low debt-to-GDP ratio, successful inflation targeting, a floating 
exchange rate, and, perhaps especially, a large stock of international reserves.    
 
All of this was capped by a coveted investment-grade rating for Brazil sovereign debt 
by Standard and Poor’s in 2008.   Brazil will always be an economy with an important 
role for the state and a distrust of markets, but its rules-based approach to 
macroeconomics puts it much closer to the OECD mainstream than to the ALBA 
consensus.   
 
Important changes are occurring in the external structure of the Brazilian economy 
leading to a fuller engagement with the world economy.   Following the “golden period” 
of export growth in 2003-2008, external trade is now 25% of GDP, close to the level of 
other large economies, and almost twice the level of a decade ago in Brazil.  Much, but 
not all, of export growth is commodity based, including both industrial raw materials and 
agricultural products.  It has been said that if China is (or aspires to be) the world’s 
factory, Brazil is its farm, and also one of its critical suppliers of raw materials.    
 
In the past,   Brazil has been reluctant to embrace this role of food and raw material 
exporter with its implicit connotation of low technology.  This attitude seems to be fading 
as export growth is seen not only as a means of relieving Brazil’s chronic foreign 
exchange problems, but also insulating the economy from external shocks and 
stimulating economic growth.  The stable exchange rate has permitted a much higher 
level of imports of technology from abroad which have benefited consumers and 
industries.   
 
New lobbies within the business community have emerged in favor of freer trade, 
countering to some extent the still strong influence of the São Paulo elites.  Moreover, the 
emergence of a global agribusiness based in Brazil has raised the profile of sectors 
favoring greater trade liberalization and injected an offensive agenda for Brazil in global 
Comments to the Conference on Brazil and Transatlantic Relations 
Page 5 of 8 
trade talks.   By the same token, the important growth of very large Brazilian companies 
with global reach, companies such as Gerdau, Odebrecht, Vale, and Petrobras itself, are 
challenging the way in which Brazilians think about the role of multinational enterprise.  
While it is true that Brazil is not very market-friendly, it is firm-friendly, and seeks to 
support this global presence by its leading state companies and private sector “national 
champions”.  As these firms grow, and their lobbying power strengthens, Brazil is likely 
to become more concerned with global efforts to facilitate international investment flows 
now that it has its own multinational companies. 
 
An Agenda for Cooperation 
 
 In short, while Brazil will continue to seek a “world without the West” and to 
strengthen its South-South ties, the factors promoting a greater global integration are very 
powerful and suggest that the predominant tendency for Brazil in the future will be 
cooperation with the U.S. and the E.U.  For many reasons, it makes eminent sense for the 
transatlantic community to incorporate and accommodate Brazil within the institutions 
that govern the global economy, not isolate it or patronize it.  A number of policy areas 
come immediately to mind where grater inclusion of Brazil would be helpful.5
 
• Reform of global governance 
 
  Brazil has been a leading voice calling for increased representation of the 
developing countries in global economic decision-making and norm-setting.  Reform of 
the IMF is the starting point.  The agenda includes increasing the resources of the Fund, 
revising conditionality requirements, and improving its governance.  This old “chairs and 
shares” debate has gained new urgency in the context of the global financial crisis.  Brazil 
would be very supportive of reforms to place the IMF at the center of global policy 
coordination, rather than leaving that to the G-8 (or the G-1, for that matter) or another ad 
hoc group of nations.  More to the point of the global crisis, the world would benefit from 
an enhanced ability of the Fund to lend freely to poorer economies grappling with sharp 
declines in government revenues and export earnings. 
 
• Reform of global financial regulation 
 
Global financial sector reform is needed to create a well functioning network of 
national and regional authorities.  In this area in which North-South cooperation is 
essential, Brazil has been in the forefront of this debate to provide truly international 
supervision of financial institutions with a global reach as these have proven to be 
channels by which financial  shocks originating in the North are transmitted quickly to 
the South.   
 
 
                                                 
5 For background on more inclusive approaches to global economic management: “South Centre Calls for 
Revamping the Global Financial Architecture”,  November 2008, www.SouthCentre.org; and Amar 
Bhattacharya et al, “Responding to the Financial Crisis: An Agenda for Global Action”, paper prepared for 
“Global Financial Crisis Meeting”, Columbia University, November 13, 2008. 
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• A new consensus on global trade liberalization 
 
The most obvious area for cooperation would be for the transatlantic community to 
enlist Brazil’s support in stemming the tide toward increased protectionism that has been 
spawned by the decline of global trade in 2009.  Looking more to the longer term beyond 
combating protectionism, Brazil is well placed in global trade talks to bridge 
longstanding differences between North and South particularly in the areas of market 
access and agricultural trade.  Elements of a global grand bargain are liberalized trade in 
agricultural products, including ethanol, in exchange for significant movement by 
emerging economies on industrial sector liberalization and trade-related disciplines, such 
as government procurement.6   The evolution of trade strategy in Brazil itself points in 
exactly this direction.  If so, and if Brazil signals a clearer intent to make concessions in 
exchange for benefits, it could have a powerful impact on the G-20 grouping of nations 
within the broader WTO talks.   
 
• A global framework on energy and climate change 
 
Brazil plays a potentially important in critical areas of energy and climate change 
where North-South collaboration is needed and presently lacking.  Brazil is obviously a 
global leader in the use and production of biofuels, including ethanol, and is committed to 
further research and to the development of truly global markets for trade in greener forms 
of energy.  The March 2007 U.S.-Brazil agreement for research and technology in the 
production of biofuels has produced very little; it needs to be revisited and revitalized and 
perhaps extended to other countries.   On climate change, Brazil has an enormously 
important role to play as steward of the resources of the Amazon region.  Perhaps 
because of this global responsibility and the perception that this places limits on domestic 
development, Brazil has struggled to develop a coherent national strategy toward climate 
change.  Enhanced collaboration and dialogue on climate change between Brazil and the 
United States, which has its own reasons for ambivalence on the subject, could improve 
the likelihood of success at the coming December 2009 Copenhagen meetings leading to 
a post-Kyoto global compact. 
 
• Development beyond trade: new sources of financing for emerging economies 
 
The global crisis has pointed to the need for long-term financing for low-income 
emerging economies when private financing via bank lending or bond markets dries up.  
This involves creating a much more important role for multilateral and regional 
development banks, an issue that Brazil has favored.   Part of the task involves tapping 
into resources in the emerging markets themselves, including China and the Gulf states.   
Regional arrangements can also be important, including swap arrangements with Central 
Banks, the pooling of reserve funds, support for regional bond markets, and increased 
                                                 
6 Brazil’s applied tariffs are relatively low by historical comparison, but it aggressively implements anti-
dumping rules (often to protect domestic monopolies or oligopolies) and practices extremely high effective 
rates of protection.  Clearly, the elites in Brazil who dominate industry and the foreign ministry are aware 
that they may be losers under broad trade liberalization. Is this really true, and, if so, how can these groups 
be compensated as part of the global bargain on increasing trade?   
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capital for the multilateral banks.   The point is that a more balanced flow of investment 
financing, one which assures a more reliable source of credit to the emerging economies 
than private markets are capable of providing, could produce a more stable world 
economy in the future by directing more surplus savings to economies (such as Brazil) 
where the rates or return on investment are the highest.  Besides being an advocate for 
less developed emerging economies, Brazil itself could obviously benefit from a 
strengthened network of multilateral and regional lenders as it seeks to overcome 
chronically low levels of public investment, including poor economic and social 





Brazil’s peaceful rise in global affairs makes it an extremely attractive partner in 
global initiatives for the US and the EU.  While often wishing to project an image of anti-
status quo, the thesis here is that Brazil actually would welcome a more meaningful role 
in managing and reforming the institutions and practices of global governance.   Brazil’s 
long-held aspirations for regional and global leadership are finally coming into better 
balance with its capabilities and its self-confidence is improving.  For many reasons, 
including the shock of the global crisis, Brazil is ready for a more concrete and mature 
interaction with both the US and the EU.  In equal measure, the global shock underlines 
why reform in the system of global governance to include more voice for the emerging 
economies is vitally necessary and why Brazil is a particularly valuable partner in this 
effort for the transatlantic community.   The global North has become accustomed to 
treating with indifference or lip service Brazil’s aspiration for greater inclusion in global 
governance and a more equal partnership with the transatlantic community.  The great 
crisis of global capitalism 2008-09 has revealed how outmoded this non-policy truly is. 
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